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DOES A TOUGHER COMPETITION POLICY REDUCE OR PROMOTE INVESTMENT? 
 
 






 The question of how interventions from the Competition Authority (CA) 
affect investment is not a straightforward one: a tougher competition policy might, 
by reducing the ability to exert market power, either stimulate firms to invest 
more to counter the restrictions on their actions, or make firms invest less because 
of the reduced ability to have a return on investment.  
This tension is illustrated using two models. In one model investment is 
own-cost-reducing whereas in the other investment is anti-competitive. Anti-
competitive investments are defined as investments that increase competitors’ 
costs. In both models the optimal level of investment is reduced with a tougher 
competition policy. Furthermore, while in the case of an anti-competitive 
investment a tougher authority necessarily leads to lower prices, in the case of a 
cost-reducing investment the opposite may happen when the impact of the 
investment on cost is sufficiently high. Results for total welfare are ambiguous in 
the cost-reducing investment model, whereas in the anti-competitive investment 
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1 – INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, competition policy issues are in the spotlight. In several industries, 
Competition Authorities (CA) come into play, limiting and conditioning the activities of 
firms for the greater good of consumers and welfare in general. In recent times, the focus 
of economic policy has been increasingly on the protection of welfare through the 
fostering of innovation. The recognition and defense of the latter as the main engine 
driving consumer welfare in the economy is at the center of this change in stance. Thus, 
the relationship between investment and competition policy is one that is really relevant 
for the aforementioned discussion. 
Of the many influences CAs have on the firms’ decisions, we address the simple 
question of how an increase in the toughness of competition policy affects the overall level 
of investment in a given industry. Results indicate that investment is always reduced by an 
increase in the toughness of the CA’s actions. The type of investments we consider are only 
cost-influencing operational processes, and so do not innovate the product in terms of its 
quality, diversity, or in any other way. 
We use two models, differing in the type of investment firms make, to address the 
issue in both monopoly and oligopoly. The first model is one in which firms invest to 
reduce their own costs, whereas in the second model the investment made increases the 
costs of the other firms in the industry. The reduction in the level of investment has 
different implications in each setting: in the first case, the reduction in investment per se is 
bad from the point of view of productive efficiency, because in leads to an increase in 
production costs; on the other hand, for the anti-competitive investment case, the 
reduction in the level of investment is good from the point of view of the efficiency of 
production and resource allocation (fewer resources wasted in anti-competitive 
practices). 
Afterwards, we show that the evolution of prices/quantities and welfare-related 
measures will vary across models. For illustrative purposes, numerical examples are 
presented. The cost-reducing investment case produces ambiguous welfare results that 
depend on the investment parameters pertaining to each firm, whereas for the anti-
competitive investment case, the results seem to point out in the direction of an 
unambiguous increase in welfare with increases in the toughness of the competition 
policy. 
The organization of the paper is done as follows. Section 2 presents a literature 
review, followed by the presentation of the models in Section 3. The ensuing Section 4 
explores the link between the toughness of competition policy and the level of investment, 
prices and welfare-related measures. Afterwards, free entry will be addressed in Section 5 
and social optimality considerations are explored in Section 6. The conclusion will wrap 
up the basic insights, while focusing on the possible limitations and further possible 
improvements to the analysis. 
2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the European Union competition laws have had a great importance with the 
creation of the Common Market. Although a unified approach to these problems at the 
European level was never portrayed as essential, articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (formerly articles 81 and 82 of the European 
Community Treaty) and their prescriptions were implemented in the national legal 
 




frameworks, defining the lines along which each country’s Competition and Regulation 
Policies should work.  
Before we start going deeper into the discussion, a formal definition of competition 
policy is required. The functional definition Massimo Motta (2004) gives of competition 
policy as “the set of policies and laws which ensure that competition in the marketplace is 
not restricted in such a way as to reduce economic welfare” (p. xvii in the Preface) is a 
very clear one. The emphasis is given to competition policy in situations in which the 
market alone will not lead to the best outcome for society. Even in industries in which 
there are no market failures, firms might resort to practices that increase their profits 
possibly to the detriment of society1. 
From the previous paragraph, the objective of competition policy should be one of 
maximizing welfare, whose definition is sometimes controversial2. Apart from this 
particular definition, the aim of this paper is to discuss initially the effects a tougher 
competition policy has on the incentives given to firms to invest, in line with the emphasis 
given to innovation by Competition Authorities, as the major driving force in the economy 
behind consumer welfare. This analysis is somehow similar to the one presented in some 
R&D policy analysis papers, with a different tack: instead of seeking the optimal subsidy 
policy for investment, we are assessing effects of preventing more aggressively the use of 
prohibited practices on investment decisions.  
Because the type of investments considered in this paper concerns only 
operational processes (only cost related) and is not related with product innovation, some 
R&D relevant issues, such as technological spillovers, imitation and Intellectual Property 
Rights, preemptive patenting and licensing of technology, will not be treated here for the 
sake of simplicity3. The streamlined framework allows us, nevertheless, to model and 
discuss some important features of competition policy easily. 
Moreover, our analysis will be limited in scope and will not focus thoroughly on 
optimal R&D subsidies/taxes4, neither on the relationship between market structures and 
innovation (Aghion et al. (2005))5 6, nor on the relationship between strategic interactions 
(of incumbents and entrants) and antitrust policy (Etro (2008)).   
As relevant as all these contributions are, there seems to be a void in academic 
literature when it comes to assessing the effects a tougher competition policy has on 
                                                          
1 Motta (2004) refers as market failures examples natural monopoly features of markets, sunk cost 
industries, lock-in effects and switching costs, and network effects. As possibly harmful practices he 
refers collusion, exclusionary and predatory behavior, and competition-lessening mergers. 
2 Motta (2004) talks about the issue of whether to use just consumer surplus as the measure of 
welfare to the competition authority or to include also the profits of firms in the equation under the 
justification that consumers are the ultimate owners of firms. 
3  On licensing of innovations see Gans and Stern (2000). Check Gilbert and Newbery (1982) for an 
approach on preemptive patenting by incumbents. 
4 Dixit (1988), Leahy and Neary (1997), Barros and Nilssen (1999), are examples of different takes 
on this problem. 
5 In this sense, no sophisticated considerations on the tradeoff between Schumpeterian 
appropriability vs. increases in competition are made here.  
6 A survey on the relationship between market structure and innovation is conducted by Kamien 
and Schwartz (1975). 
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investment7. Even literature aimed specifically to address competition policy has generally 
tip-toed around this subject while addressing other relevant issues regarding antitrust.  
One of the exceptions8 to the general panorama is the contribution by Martin 
(2002), whose dynamic monopolistic model infers that, for highly technologically 
advanced industries, a tougher competition policy in the pre-innovation phase might be 
beneficial for welfare, by increasing the intensity of research and the speed of innovation.   
Although very interesting, some issues in Martin’s paper are not complete, since 
the use of monopolistic industries excludes strategic interactions between firms’ 
investments. Furthermore, anti-competitive use of investments is not contemplated, 
neither are considerations about the format of the fine function. This paper will try to 
address some of these issues, nonetheless with a much simpler model than the one 
presented by Martin. 
In particular, calling on aspects present in many R&D models and Becker´s seminal 
contributions on optimal fines (1968), this paper will sidestep some relevant aspects of 
competition policy such as optimal legal standards (Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009)),  
optimal merger policy (Sorgard (2009)), remedy bargaining (Lyons and Medvedev 
(2007)) and leniency (Motta (2004) and Harrington Jr. (2008)). Instead, the link between 
a tougher competition policy and investment will be explored in a simplified setting, 
through the increase in the level of the fine and probability of detection of the abusive 
practice. After such an analysis, we shall focus on price/quantity effects, from where we 
will refer back to welfare considerations. 
3 – THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR TWO MODELS 
3.1 – COMMON ASSUMPTIONS 
Both models are characterized by 2 stages: Firstly, the firms must decide on the 
amount of investment (cost-reducing in the first model, anti-competitive in the second) 
they will make; afterwards, in the second stage, they must decide which quantity/price to 
set in the market. Both decisions are affected by the expectation each firm has on the level 
of supervision and the severity of the punishment by the CA. Competition in the second 
stage is done in quantities with homogeneous product (standard Cournot setting).  Each 
firm is risk neutral and maximizes its expected profit. 
We assume here that all firms have rational expectations insofar as the expected 
levels of supervision and fine level are exogenous relative to the firms’ activities and are 
the ones that are really verified in practice. This presents quite a detour from reality since 
the level of supervision (the amount of resources ascribed to supervision) decided by the 
CA is normally decided ex-ante market interactions, while the level of the concrete fine is 
determined (although within certain limits imposed by the law) ex-post, depending on the 
case in hand. This assumption allows us to focus on the interplay of investment incentives 
and the toughness of competition policy. 
                                                          
7 Approaches without the inclusion of a formal model and focusing only on a theoretical discussion 
of the subject exist (e.g.: Jorde and Teece (1990), Shapiro (2002), and Gaffard and Quéré (2006)). 
8 Chang (1995) addresses the theme of optimal antitrust policy in a cumulative innovating industry, 
but the issue is somehow subsidiary to optimal patent and contractual arrangements between firms 
on how to divide the benefits of innovation. 
 




In both cases, the intensity of supervision by the CA is represented by a 
probability, ranging from 0 to 1. The overall level of the fine is a linear function of the 
difference between price and marginal cost, with a parameter determining the severity of 
such punishment. The major difference between both models is the format of the 
investment schedule of each firm: whereas one is own-cost-reducing, the other increases 
the costs of the competing firms (anti-competitive investment). 
The justification for this dichotomy is the fact that we are aware of different types 
of investment alternatives for firms, each with one or both the effects stated above (i. e., 
cost-reducing/anti-competitive), and so the goal for constructing two models is to 
separate each type of investment effect and assess the effectiveness of anti-trust policy vis-
à-vis abusive practices in each context. 
The analysis will not focus on interactions between the rate of detection, the level 
of fine, the rate of conviction and their optimal combinations9. Similarly, it will not 
consider feedback effects of the actions of the firms on the probability of detection, nor on 
the variable for the severity of punishment. Instead, it will focus solely on the effects of an 
overall tougher competition policy on investment, with the firms being risk neutral agents. 
According to Becker (1968), the fact that the agent is risk neutral allows us, excluding the 
operating costs of the CA, to be oblivious as to whether the increase in the toughness of the 
CA is due to an augmentation in the rate of detection or to an increment in the level of the 
fine. For most part of the analysis, we will treat increases in the toughness of competition 
policy as increases in either the rate of detection or the level of the fine, but never 
discriminating amongst the two of them. 
In the two models, the configuration of the fine function seems justified in the 
sense that it depends on what the level of the contribution margin of a firm is, and 
consequently tries to capture the feature that the punishment depends on the level of 
abuse of market power. Although the reality is that abusive practices might make firms 
bear punishment as percentage of their revenues or other accounting measures, the fact 
that the punishment is indexed to the difference between price and marginal cost is 
somehow realistic, as a measure of abusive practices (excessive pricing) from the firms10. 
In a sense, the punishment system in the model draws on some aspects of Becker’s 
seminal model (1968), by assuming a level of supervision of the CA portrayed by the 
probability of getting caught and also a fine function dependent on the severity of 
infringement. However, in this case we cannot construe the fine function as being based 
neither on the gains to the firms nor on the harm caused to consumers (Miceli, 2004). The 
difference between price and marginal cost cannot be interpreted as a manifestation of the 
former any more than of the latter. 
                                                          
9 Becker (1968), Andreoni (1991) and Bose (1995) provide examples of such type of analyses. 
10 Along the course of the research process, a model with the same basic structure as the margin-
based with cost-reducing investment was built up, with the sole difference that the probability of 
intervention and the severity of the fine were indexed to the revenue of each firm. Overall, the 
results were indicating welfare worsening with interventions by the CA, and the numerical 
examples, notwithstanding being quite irregular, also showed a high level of inefficiency relative to 
our base model. These results were omitted because the fact that the fine function was not indexed 
to a valid measure of the abuse of market power of firms (as the contribution margin) might have 
biased seriously the results against any intervention at all. Due to this lack of specification, we 
avoided this model because it would give us a disproportionately detrimental stand towards 
intervention by the CA. 
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The analysis of both models is conducted in the case of monopoly and oligopoly 
with a Cournot setting in the second stage. In a situation of monopoly (only for the cost-
reducing investment model), the absence of strategic effects makes the use of the two-
stage form irrelevant, so it is only kept for the sake of presentation convenience. In the 
oligopoly situation, we assume symmetry of the firms and the same probability of 
detection and severity of the fine for all the firms in the market. 
In the oligopoly case, the game structure is as follows: in the first stage firms 
decide the level of investment they will undertake and, having chosen those levels and the 
marginal costs they will have in production, they proceed to the second stage where they 
play a Cournot quantity-competition game. The game is solved by backward induction. 
3.2 – MARGIN-BASED MODEL WITH COST-REDUCING INVESTMENT: SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS 
We assume a linear demand function , for . For any firm i 
in the market ( ), marginal costs are: , (with c large enough to 
ensure  ) where  is firm ’s level of investment,  an investment efficiency 
parameter, and  the cost of investment is    , with a cost parameter 11  The individual 
profit of firm is represented by We will only consider, for the oligopoly structure, 
cases in which  
In the model, the fine function is characterized by , for 
 while , for , with  being the level of  severity of the 
CA’s Punishment. Our results will also hold for if  if is not 
very large; or for if , so the use of the contribution margin is not too 
restrictive an assumption for our model. The rate of detection , with , is 
representative of the intensity of supervision and thus the effort put in by the CA in the 
detection of market power abuses. In equilibrium,   is needed for a firm to have 
non-negative profits if .  
For the monopoly case (subscripts not included), the firm’s expected profit 
function is (assuming maximization through prices)  
 
This can be rearranged as 
 
Taking  and looking at the profit function, it is noticeable that an 
increase in the toughness of the CA (increase in ) amounts to decreasing the overall 
expected demand for the firm’s product.  The  is like a tax on the units sold by the firm. 
For the oligopoly case, the expected profit function of the individual firm  
( ) is 
                                                          
11 This type of structure is present in many literature on R&D: D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988); 
Kamien et al. (1992); Barros and Nilssen (1999); Grünfeld (2003), for example, all present the 
same kind of model with linear demand, cost reducing investment and concave investment cost 
function, and use it in very diverse applications. 
 





With . On the other hand, the above expression collapses to 
 
Like in the monopoly case, it is as if the regulation reduced the expected number of 
units sold, similar to a tax on the quantities sold by the firm.  The implications of this 
particular fine function configuration will be addressed below. 
3.3 – MARGIN-BASED MODEL WITH ANTI-COMPETITIVE INVESTMENT: SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS 
A slightly different investment schedule is assumed in this model relative to 
subsection 3.2. The same assumptions as in the regular margin-based model are taken, 
with the sole exception that now investments increase the other firms’ marginal costs. For 
obvious reasons only cases in which the number of firms is larger than 1 can be 
considered ( ). This mimics a real attempt to falsify competition by a firm, which can 
take many forms in the real world. It is portrayed here, with no loss of generality, as an 
ordinary investment. This type of modeling can be applied, for example, to situations in 
which a firm invests to preclude the access of other firms to essential facilities, or signs off 
on any exclusive contracts with suppliers (hindering competitors’ access to inputs). 
We assume here that a firm’s anti-competitive investment affects equally all 
competitors through a parameter . The marginal cost schedule of each firm 
in the market is therefore 
 
Where is a vector of all the investment options of the  firms in the market 
excluding . It is assumed that the anti-competitive investment each firm makes has 
convex cost as in the previous case. Assuming surveillance over all firms’ simultaneous 
investment actions is too onerous or complex, the CA will neither be able to forbid nor to 
detect the anti-competitive investment by each firm, and so will act, as well as in the 
previous model, only on market outcome (the margin ). 
In the symmetric firms situation ( ), which is the case analyzed here, 
the fine function in this context finds a further justification relatively to the first model 
because the firm with the lowest marginal cost (or with higher margin ) is also 
the firm that makes the most of the anti-competitive investment in equilibrium. This way, 
the fine function will penalize in a harsher way the most serious perpetrators of anti-
competitive practices. 
The objective function of each firm will be the expected profit function 
 




This collapses to 
 
As in the original case, the intervention by the CA acts as if it were a reduction in 
the expected quantity sold by the firm. As well as in the cost-reducing investment 
situation,  is a quantity equivalent to the fine. Naturally, we assume 
i. e., the contribution margin is non-negative. 
4 – EFFECTS OF A TOUGHER COMPETITION POLICY 
4.1 - MARGIN-BASED MODEL WITH COST-REDUCING INVESTMENT 
In terms of the equilibrium values and conditions imposed, the monopoly case 
appears to be a mere particular case of the more general many-firms case. As a first main 
result, in the cost-reducing investment model, the presence of symmetric competition 
from other firms in the market does not alter the qualitative nature of the results in 
comparison to the monopoly case. Therefore, the results presented here concern the 
oligopoly case, but are nevertheless applicable to the monopoly case by setting  in 
the equilibrium expressions.  
Proposition 112: With cost-reducing investment, a tougher competition policy: 
a)  reduces the individual firm’s level of investment ( ) and the total 
level of investment in the industry13. 
b)  if , makes the level of total quantity in the market and individual firm 
quantities increase. If , quantities decrease, and if   , 
quantities stay the same. 
c) decreases  (or, if ,  will remain the same), and  
will be smaller, irrespective of   
d) if   , makes the evolution of the individual firm’s profit margin be 
unambiguously non-positive. 
                                                          
12 All proofs reported in the Annexes. 
13 In this problem, the second-order condition that must be fulfilled in the investment optimization 
problem of each firm is   . 
 




e) makes the consumer surplus ( ) increase if   , decrease if
, and remain the same if  
Pertaining especially to a), it seems in both cases (monopoly and oligopoly) that 
the contraction in expected demand, motivated by increases in the toughness of the 
competition policy, reduces the incentive to invest by the firms. The reduction in the 
expected number of units sold in the market makes the costs incurred while investing not 
worthwhile for firms, since the latter will only be able to take advantage of cost reductions 
over a limited expected range of units.  
Following from the above results, the effect of  on the equilibrium individual 
level of investment is more negative if the number of firms increases. The derivative 
 is given by the expression 
 
and will be negative as long as   , which is automatically verified if the second 
order condition is satisfied, for any . The incentive to disinvest induced by a tougher 
competition policy is therefore heightened by a larger number of firms/higher 
competition in the market. This result is in accordance with our intuition, since, in a 
context of symmetric firms, the appropriation of the gains from investment is reduced 
with lower market shares and a tougher competition. 
 Following the results from b) for small 14, as the number of symmetric firms in 
the market increases, it might be more likely for firms formerly belonging to the interval 
 to fall in the interval . Thus, it is possible to have, for a market 
with small number of firms, all with the same   , a beneficial increase in  from the point 
of view of consumers; while a slight increase in the number of the same type of firms could 
make an equal intervention be detrimental for consumers. Therefore, from this 
standpoint, a tougher competition policy seems more justified in markets with smaller 
number of firms. This provides the intuitive insight that competition policy is more 
adequate in markets with less competitive pressure, at least from the point of view of 
consumers. 
The general intuitions for b) can be generalized for the monopoly and oligopoly 
cases. The explanation of the equilibrium values in oligopoly is similar to the monopoly 
case, with the only difference that the expected marginal revenue is calculated over the 
expected residual demand of each firm. 
                                                          
14 In fact, as the number of firms  tends to infinity, the length of the interval will tend 
to zero, as both the lower bound and the upper bound will converge to 2. Thus, as the number of 
firms converges to infinity, the range of situations in which prices increase/quantities decrease due 
to a tougher competition policy becomes smaller. 
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For the case where marginal costs of investment are high relative to the marginal 
gains from investment ( ), the amount of equilibrium investment is small in the 
first place. The reduction in the expected demand, motivated by the increase in , induces 
a reduction in investment, but by a low absolute value. The fact that  is relatively small 
makes the resulting increase in , and its effect to increase /decrease , ineffective 
relative to the direct effect of  to shift inwards the expected residual demand and 
increase the marginal incentive to decrease price.  This can be seen in the tension between 
the two terms in the derivative of equilibrium individual quantities to 15, with the first 
term having the upper hand in this case ).  The lower prices and larger 
quantities are obviously beneficial for consumers. 
The converse situation happens for a relatively low   ( ), in 
which case the amount of equilibrium investment and its reduction due to  are very high 
to begin with, and so, also due to a relatively high , its indirect effect through  
prevails over the direct effect (through marginal revenue) of  over prices. The net effect 
of  on the price level is positive in this case, and consumers are hurt.   
Graphically, the issue can be easily addressed (see Figure 1) for both monopoly 
and oligopoly. The case presented portrays the effects of an increase in  relative to the 
situation of no intervention at all, but can be generalized easily to increases in  relative 
to situations with already positive . The initial equilibrium is the one signaled with the 
white dot. The (residual) demand and expected (residual) demand are the same since  
is equal to zero. Here, the firm maximizes its profit by setting the price/quantities that 
equate its marginal cost to its expected marginal revenue, reaching the white equilibrium 
in the process.  
                                                          
15 Check the annex (Proof 1b)) for the expression. 
 
 




For a similar increase in  the two situations can occur: the one in which
 , and so, increases/ decreases in contrast to the initial situation (shown in 
the figure); and the other in which   , and so, the equilibrium price decreases 
( increases). In both cases, there is a contraction in the expected demand faced by the 
firm and likewise on its expected marginal revenue schedule, although the market demand 
is the same. The objective of expected profit maximization to the firm on the 
pricing/quantity stage is translated into equating the expected (residual) marginal 
revenue to the marginal cost. If there were no effects on the costs through investment 
levels, the effect of a decrease in marginal (residual) revenue alone would be conducive to 
a decrease in price. The difference between the two cases lies in the relative strengths of 
the effects of cost increase caused by the reduction in investment.  
In the first case from figure 1  - the red-dotted equilibrium -, 
the reduction in investment has such a huge effect on cost increase that the new 
equilibrium price, as seen in the expected demand curve, raises beyond its former level. 
The equilibrium quantity sold in the market, seen in the original (residual) demand curve, 
drops as a result. Inversely, if , the cost-push effect driven by the reduction in 
investment is not enough to counter the effect of a lower (residual) marginal revenue 
schedule, the price level decreases with the increase in  and the equilibrium quantity 
(seen in the original demand curve) rises. 
It seems the less efficient investment is marginally and the higher marginal costs of 
investment are, the better the effects of a tougher competition policy are to consumers.  
Thus, an argument to lessen the regulation in the regions of the investment schedule in 
which investments are marginally more productive and efficient is implied.  Again, this 
result does not act counter-intuitively, since we expect that, from an economic efficiency 
point of view, the most productive investments should be favored relative to the least 
efficient ones. 
Related with this discussion (and subsection e)), consumer surplus can either 
improve or not with increased toughness of the intervention, depending on the interplay 
of the relative effects on the expected marginal revenue and level of investment. However, 
based on c), the tougher policy seems to attain one of its objectives: to lower the firms’ 
market power (as measured by the contribution margin), irrespective of the direction of 
the change in prices. 
The expression 
 
represents the proceeds to the CA. The evolution of  is not monotonic with . In 
fact, the proceeds are concave in  and attain a maximum at  The non-
monotonicity of the evolution of proceeds with  is due to the fact that, with increases in 
, a larger multiple of the contribution margin is taken by the CA, but nevertheless the 
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contribution margin of the firms diminishes with increases in the toughness of the 
competition policy16. 
The evolution of welfare with the degree of regulation is not clear in any of the 
situations at hand. In this analysis, we do not consider the operating costs of the CA for 
simplicity reasons17. For the effect of an increase in intervention is not 
clear. We have to bear in mind that the proceeds received by the CA correspond exactly to 
the penalty paid by firms and so they cancel each other out.  In this sense, the proceeds 
collected by the CA, per se, do not generate any economic value. 
Although the effect of extra regulation on the profit of an individual firm is 
negative, the effect on consumer surplus is dependent on the level of  , and the effect on 
the proceeds will always depend on the previous level of . From the previous analysis, it 
seems more likely that, for lower ratios of  , the effect of increases in  will always be 
detrimental for welfare, even excluding the CA’s operating costs, because of the reduction 
in consumer surplus. Regarding the monopoly case, for illustrative purposes, two different 
numerical examples of the sign of the derivative of total welfare (TW) to  (excluding 
CA’s operating costs) are presented.  
Example 1: Taking , with  and  in this case 
and so, the sign is ambiguous, 
corroborating our predictions. If , then the evolution of 
total welfare will be negative, if , it will be positive. Therefore, assessing 
the values at  we have , and, at least marginally, it is desirable to have an 
active CA (the maximum total welfare level is attained for 
a positive amount of ). 
Example 2: If , with and , we have  
. Due to the negative effect on consumer 
surplus, TW unambiguously decreases, even though the effect on proceeds is ambiguous. 
In these cases, it is better not to have any intervention at all ( ). 
Looking at the second example, the usual rule-of-thumb of looking primarily to the 
evolution of consumer surplus to infer the evolution of TW, used by the CAs, seems to be 
quite appropriate for the monopoly situation at hand. The sheer size of the consumer 
surplus makes its variations relatively more important than the evolution of proceeds in 
this case. This way, it trumps completely the ambiguous (and so, possibly positive) effect 
the evolution of the proceeds might have over the level of TW. 
                                                          
16 In the monopoly case, an interesting insight related to the proceeds-maximizing  is that it is 
equal to the monopoly profit maximizing quantity to the problem
∗= ∗= − 2 . This corresponds to the monopolist problem with zero investment. In a sense, this 
means that if the CA decides to take upon a policy to maximize proceeds, then the firm is obliged to 
invest in order to reap any positive profit from the market. Hence, positive profits accrue to the 
firm only because of investment, making it essential for the firm’s existence. 
17 In the same way, the CA’s costs being only fixed costs can be assumed and the qualitative nature 
of the results will remain unaltered. 
 




4.2 – MARGIN-BASED MODEL WITH ANTI-COMPETITIVE INVESTMENT 
The results will be presented for the oligopoly case with  symmetric firms. 
Proposition 218: With anti-competitive investment, a tougher competition policy:  
a) unambiguously lowers a firm’s equilibrium investment level. 
b)  increases equilibrium quantity (individual and total). 
c) decreases the profit level of the individual firm (or make it remain the same if 
). The contribution margin will decrease with increases in the 
toughness of competition policy. 
d) reduces the profit margin of the individual firm. 
e) increases the consumer surplus ( ). 
In this case, the justification for such a result in a) is that the reduction in each 
firm’s expected residual demand makes the investment ( ) to reduce the 
competitive ability of the rival firms less worthwhile. Due to the decrease in the expected 
number of sold units, the payoff of an improvement in a firm’s competitive position 
relative to the other firms (measured by the comparative cost advantage) decreases and, 
for the same investment parameters, the optimal level of investment diminishes. 
In particular, by computing  
 
we can assess the effect a larger number of firms have on investment. We have that, in 
order for the derivative to be positive, is needed, which is not possible, due 
to the fact that the second order condition must be satisfied ( ) and, for  
there is no way to have  . Therefore, since the incentive to disinvest by a 
tougher competition policy will increase as the number of firms increases ( ), 
we can interpret this result by stating: when the number of firms increases, the 
competitive pressure effect (less market share and lower prices leading to reduced 
investment levels) prevails over the effect brought upon by the opportunity to hinder the 
competitive ability of an increasing number of firms with anti-competitive investment.  
The fact that the effect of a tougher competition policy on individual investment is 
negative, combined with the negative net effect of overall investment (for symmetric 
firms) on individual quantities, makes the reduction on investment induced by the 
increase in  have a positive effect on the individual quantities of each firm, due to the 
decrease in marginal costs. 
                                                          
18 The annexes at the end of the paper report the proofs. 
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From b), in the first term of , the effect of the 
reduction in expected residual demand (and expected residual  marginal revenue) from 
increases in , which is a force towards increasing individual quantities (and lowering 
prices), is now reinforced by the second term ( ), which portrays a 
reduction in marginal costs of each individual firm (because of the lower anti-competitive 
investment). This can be easily seen in a graph (Figure 2) for the individual firm, 
comparing the non-regulated ( ) with the regulated situation ( ). 
Starting off from the non-regulated situation (white-dotted equilibrium) the 
increase in the toughness of the competition policy will make each firm move to the green 
equilibrium. With the original residual demand and the expected residual demand 
will coincide, and so, maximization by the individual firm will be done by a matching of the 
marginal revenue with the marginal cost. Prices and quantities are determined in this case 
by the same intercept of marginal costs and marginal revenues, and both are read from the 
original demand curve. 
With positive , the contraction in expected residual demand (and expected 
residual marginal revenue) puts a pressure towards an increase in individual quantities 
(decrease in prices), that is further helped by a decrease in the marginal costs of each 
individual firm operating in the market. These two effects produce an unambiguous drop 
in prices/increase in quantities at the market level, since an individual firm will set a new 
lower price to maximize expected profit (setting expected residual marginal revenue equal 
to marginal cost), while providing the market with an increased quantity (seen in the 
original demand curve). 
Following directly from the increase in quantities in the market, and unlike the 
previous cost-reducing investment model, an intervention here will be unambiguously 
beneficial to consumers (as seen in e)). 
 
 




The results from c) are similar to the ones obtained with a cost-reducing 
investment for the margin-based model. The difference is that we have two effects running 
against each other due to increases in : the one of a reduction in the marginal cost and 
the cost of investment (which is conducive to increases both in the profit and in the 
contribution margin); and the other of an increase in the level of competition due to the 
overall decrease in marginal cost by all firms and the reduction in the expected marginal 
revenue due to increases in the fine (which decrease both  prices and hence the profit and 
the contribution margin). The latter effect seems to dominate for all instances considered, 
with an increase in the toughness of competition policy being conducive to both a lower 
profit and lower contribution margin. 
With increases in , the evolution of the profit margin is qualitatively the same as 
the one of the contribution margin. Nevertheless, relative to the contribution margin, there 
is the subtraction of the term that pertains to the evolution of average fixed costs, which 
decrease unambiguously with . From d), however, the sign of the derivatives with 
respect to  is proven to be unambiguously the same for both types of margin (negative). 
From the opposing results found for the signs of the derivatives of welfare-related 
variables to , in abstract terms, the evolution of welfare with increases in  is 
ambiguous. Nevertheless, the simple fact that consumer surplus always increases with a 
tougher competition policy is a good indicator that competition policy might, very likely, 
be welfare beneficial (excluding operational costs of the CA for simplicity reasons19). 
For computational purposes, the proceeds ( ) to the CA are given by the 
expression 
. 
Their evolution with  is non-monotonic and concave, since an increase in  increases 
the percentage of the contribution margin of the individual firms that is retained, while 
inducing, at the same time, a decrease in the contribution margin of each firm. As in the 
previous model, the proceeds-maximizing  is set at 20  
Numerical examples using the duopolistic structure ( ) will be given to make 
our point, using the same parameter values as for the previous model21.  
Example 1: We will take  ,   and , similarly to our previous 
first example for the cost-reducing investment model. With these values, our derivative of 
total welfare with respect to  is . 
This is decreasing in , but nevertheless non-negative if  . Thus, in the 
                                                          
19 Assuming a cost structure with only fixed costs for the CA would render the same qualitative 
results. 
20 Again, the proceeds correspond exactly to a part of the total profit from the firms and do not 
produce economic value per se. 
21 This choice of parameter values is not based on specific parameter ranges of the model, nor on 
the comparability of the parameters of both models ( is not comparable to ), but is only due to 
blunt laziness of the authors in finding new values to fit the second order conditions. 
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context of the example, only for a very large fine relative to the size of the market-baseline 
cost difference ( , the second inequality because of
), we will have a negative effect from regulation on total welfare. Moreover, since
 the maximum for welfare will be attained for that 
value of . From this point of view, our previous prediction for the evolution of the 
welfare level with increases in regulation is somehow vindicated.  
Example 2: Taking, similarly to the first model’s second example,  ,  
 and , we get as the derivative for total welfare
. This is decreasing in  as well, but non-negative as long as 
 , which, taking into account that we must have leads to 
the result that only if , we will have a negative effect of  on 
welfare.  Again, the maximum level of welfare is attained for positive  (
).  
For these parameter values, the range of values for  that makes increases in  to 
produce a positive effect on total welfare is further increased in the second example 
relative to the first one. This makes some sense, since the lower  in the market, the 
higher the anticompetitive investment will be (investment becomes more profitable – less 
cost relative to the benefits) and a greater potential emerges for regulation to correct this 
situation. 
5 – EQUILIBRIUM NUMBER OF FIRMS WITH FREE ENTRY 
For both models, we will try to assess the effects of the toughness of competition 
policy on the equilibrium number of firms in the market. We obviously will take the 
oligopoly cases of each model for this, assuming symmetric firms and no barriers to entry. 
The equilibrium number of firms in each model is the closest integer below the 
level  that makes  for all firms in the industry.  
Proposition 322: The equilibrium number of firms with entry in both models will be 
the largest integer equal or smaller than  . This means that an increase in  has 
a non-positive effect in the equilibrium number of firms in our models23.  
 Therefore, in both cases, a tougher competition policy acts as a force towards 
reducing the equilibrium number of firms in the market.  Whereas this effect might be 
expected in the cost-reducing case, by decreasing the appropriability of the cost-reducing 
investment and, like so, the profits of firms in the market; in the second model, due to the 
decrease in marginal costs with  (reduction in investment), an increase in competition 
and in the number of competitors could be the case, so the intuition for a reduction in the 
                                                          
22
 Check the annexes for proof and discussion. 
23 Moreover, in both models, if the obtained  is an integer, because  we will have 
zero investment by every firm in the market. 
 




number of firms is not so straightforward. However, if we remember that, for both models, 
we have unambiguously the result   can be construed as intuitive. 
The fact that a tougher competition policy reduces the equilibrium number of firms 
portrays it as real impediment for entering firms in the market. From this point of view, 
intervention by the CA might run against the creation of more competitive market 
structures, since, if were to be equal to zero, the number of firms in the market with 
free entry would converge to infinity (assuming no entry costs)24 25. Drawing on the whole 
analysis presented, if no barriers to entry are assumed, there might be some grounds for 
the arguments from the Chicago School pertaining competition policy26. If no fixed set-up 
costs exist and competition is made in a homogeneous product market (as is the case), 
welfare might be larger with no CA intervention at all27: as the number of firms tends to 
infinity, market power is limited by construction, profits converge to zero and the 
quantities increase, leading to an increase in the consumer surplus (abstracting from the 
effects through the investment levels)28. The argument is all the more relevant if we think 
in the context of the second model, in which the (socially) harmful investment decreases 
with In the first model, however, due to effect in reducing beneficial investments, the 
tradeoff is not so clear. Nevertheless, in both cases, the fact that entry costs (of all sorts) 
are present in most of the markets is a possible factor towards excessive entry (if free 
entry is allowed), from the point of view of social optimality29. For these reasons, whether 
the restraint on free entry posed by an active competition policy is ultimately beneficial 
remains an uncertainty30. 
6 – SOCIAL OPTIMALITY 
 For starters, regarding both aforementioned models, we describe a socially 
optimal ideal situation (with no intervention by the CA). Then, we shall put forward a 
prescription for the best possible achievable outcome by the CA. 
                                                          
24 An interesting exercise would be to infer about the socially optimal number of firms  in the 
economy, the effects of intervention in that socially optimal number and how the obtained above 
compares with . In reality, we tried to do that but due to the humongous expressions for total 
welfare, their optimization with respect to the number of firms was not possible, even with 
recourse to computers with Maple©, because the resulting derivatives were intractable. 
25 Whether the entry impediments for firms are good or detrimental for welfare depends on a lot of 
issues. See Mankiw and Whinston (1986) for more on this. 
26 In the real world, the generally less interventionist stance by the CAs in markets with free entry 
relative to markets in which entry is more difficult is justified on the grounds of this reasoning. 
27 Mankiw and Whinston (1986) discuss these issues in detail. 
28 For reasonable ranges of , in both models the increase in the number of firms in the industry 
will decrease a firm’s individual investment level, which, per se, from a productive efficiency 
standpoint, can be interpreted as prejudicial in the cost-reducing model and beneficial in the anti-
competitive investment one. Numerical examples were run for the derivatives of the total 
quantities and investment in the market and, in both models, in the context of such examples, total 
quantities seem to increase and total investment seems to decrease with the number of firms in the 
market. For further discussion on these topics refer to the authors. 
29 Especially relevant if the set-up costs are of significant magnitude (Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986)). 
30 However, we are led to believe, from the insights of Mankiw and Whinston (1986), that if product 
diversification was added to the mixture, the value consumers place on variety would be an extra 
force favoring more firms in the market. The argument towards a laissez-faire approach would be 
further strengthened. 
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Proposition 431: In the cost-reducing investment model the optimal situation is to have 
only one firm setting  and (which is impossible to be reached by the 
CA, controlling only ). The best the CA can do is to set  
. 
The key point of the analysis to the cost-reducing investment model is that the 
ideal socially optimal outcome will not be reached, at least through the use of ordinary 
regulation as modeled here. Optimal regulation will assess the tradeoff of the 
discouragement of social beneficial investment with the adverse effects unbridled product 
market interaction has on consumers. From the second part, the best available panacea at 
the disposal of the CA can range from setting a negative fine (for ) to a positive one 
(if ). However, this result is only valid for somewhat restrictive values of 32. 
Proposition 533: In the anti-competitive investment model the socially optimal outcome, 
irrespective of the number of firms, has from each of the firms in the market and 
price set equal to marginal cost. Moreover, this outcome is attainable by an optimal 
competition policy setting . 
In this case, considerations of socially optimal outcomes and remedies are much 
easier because the investment is detrimental from the point of view of society. 
The question of whether it is optimal in the margin to have intervention relative to 
the case in which is also relevant for this social optimality discussion. The next 
proposition addresses this question34, assuming the second order conditions are always 
verified in both models, and so we only deal with interior solutions35. 
Proposition 6 36: Relative to the situation in which : 
a) it is better to have some intervention than no intervention at all if 
  in the own-cost-reducing investment model. 
b) it is always better to have some intervention in the anti-competitive 
investment model. 
If we take into account that, in the own-cost-reducing investment model, for 
the fulfillment of the second order condition  makes 
22 ( +1)2 be automatically satisfied, we have a good indication that, at least marginally, 
it is preferable to have some intervention rather than no intervention at all.  
                                                          
31 See the annexes for proof and brief discussion. 
32 For more on this, go to the proof of Proposition 4 in the annexes. 
33 Go to the annexes for proof and discussion. 
34 Again, no operational costs of the CA are assumed and we abstract from free entry considerations 
35 Situations in which the second order conditions are not verified represent added complexity in 
terms of equilibrium values. Moreover, the possible corner solutions arising will not make it easy to 
depict the effects of marginal changes in the toughness of the competition policy. Therefore, such 
considerations were not included for the sake of the simplicity and cogency of the argument. 
36 Check the annexes for proof. 
 




For both of models presented, the results from this latter proposition augur well of 
the success an active CA might have on the promotion of total welfare. Indeed, for the 
computations performed, only for a minority of cases37 a marginal intervention from the 
CA will be welfare-worsening. 
7 – CONCLUSION 
 The initial question asked whether or not a tougher competition policy impacts 
negatively on investment by firms. In the anti-competitive investment model a tougher CA 
unambiguously decreases prices, increasing total welfare. In the cost-reducing investment 
case, the ultimate effect on prices depends on the relative strength of the pressure exerted 
by regulation to lower prices versus the increase in costs resulting from the decrease in 
investment. A valid conclusion from the last case is that a tougher CA is best suited to 
situations in which investments are not very efficient and impact of investment on costs is 
not very high, because price decreases will be more likely.  
 Additionally, in both models with free entry, with symmetric firms and no barriers 
to entry, a tougher competition policy has a non-positive effect on the equilibrium number 
of firms in the market. This is due to its non-positive effect on individual firm profit. 
 In terms of social optimality, whereas in the anti-competitive investment model 
competition policy can attain the first best solution for total welfare, only a second best 
solution can be attained in cost-reducing investment model. Moreover, some intervention 
by the CA is better than no intervention at all for every case of the anti-competitive 
investment model and for the cost-reducing investment model as long as there is more 
than one firm in the market. 
One ought to bear in mind that the presented outcomes are extremely sensitive to 
the particular assumptions taken38. Further pathways for research in this field might be to 
consider some issues left apart in this paper and try to assess what the effects of a tougher 









                                                          
37 Namely for the own-cost-reducing model with and . In 
monopoly, this portrays the situation in which price increases/quantity decreases with regulation. 
This might be somehow puzzling since, by intuition, regulation is expected to be more worthwhile 
in a monopoly situation (to counter the excessive market power of the monopolist). Nevertheless, 
justification might be found in the fact that, for those situations in which the parameter values are 
conducive to a rise in prices with increases in regulation, that marginal rise in prices is especially 
high in the monopoly case. In these situations, the increase in the proceeds to the CA is not 
sufficient to cover for both the losses in consumer surplus and profit of the monopolist.  
38
 For instance, Martin (2002), by building a dynamic monopolistic model, reaches conclusions that 
show that a tougher CA is conducive to increases in investment and in the speed of innovation. 
 
DOES A TOUGHER COMPETITION POLICY REDUCE OR PROMOTE INVESTMENT? 
20 
 
8 - BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aghion, Phillippe, Nicholas Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith, and Peter Howitt, 2005, 
“Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
701-728. 
Andreoni, James, 1991,“Reasonable doubt and the optimal magnitude of fines: should the penalty fir 
the crime?”, RAND Journal of Economics, 22(3), 385-395. 
Barros, Pedro and Tore Nilsson, 1999, “Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity”, Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, 101(4), 597-616. 
Becker, Gary S., 1968, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”, The Journal of Political 
Economy, 76(2), 169-217. 
Bose, Pinaki, 1995, “Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 56, 475-484. 
Chang, Howard F., 1995, “Patent scope, antitrust policy and cumulative innovation”, RAND Journal 
of Economics, 26(1), 34-57. 
D'Aspremont, Claude, and Alexis Jacquemin, 1988, “ Cooperative and Noncooperative R & D in 
Duopoly with Spillovers”, The American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133-1137. 
Dixit, Avinash K., 1986, “Comparative Statics for Oligopoly”, International Economic Review, 27(1), 
107-122. 
Dixit, Avinash K., 1988, “A General Model of R&D Competition and Policy”, The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 19(3), 317-326. 
Dutta, Prajit K., 1999, Strategies and Games: Theory and Practice, The MIT Press.  
Etro, Federico, 2008, “Endogenous market Structures and Anti-Trust Policy”, 
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/endogenous/pdf/Etro.pdf , manuscript. 
Gaffard, Jean-Luc and Michel Quéré, “What’s the aim for competition policy: optimizing market 
structure or encouraging innovative behaviors ?“, 2006, Journal Evol. Econ., 16, 175-187.  
Gans, Joshua S. and Scott Stern, 2000, “Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale of 
Creative Destruction”, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9(4), 485-511.  
Gibbons, Robert, 1992, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press. 
Gilbert, Richard J. and David M. G. Newbery, 1982, “Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of 
Monopoly”, The American Economic Review, 72(3), 514-526. 
Grünfeld, Leo, 2003, “Meet me halfway but don’t rush: absorptive capacity and strategic R&D 
investment revisited”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 1091-1109. 
Harrington Jr, Joseph E., 2008, “Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs”, The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 56(2), 215-246. 
Jorde, Thomas M. and David J. Teece, 1990, “Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for 
Competition and Antitrust”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(3), 75-96. 
Kamien, Morton I., Eitan Muller, and Israel Zang, 1992, “Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels”, 
The American Economic Review, 82(5), 1293-1306. 
Kamien, Morton I. and Nancy Schwartz, 1975, ”Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey”, Journal 
of Economic Literature, 13(1), 1-37.  
Katsolacos, Yannis, and David Ulph, 2009, “On Optimal Legal Standards for Competition Policy: A 
General Welfare-Based Analysis”, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 57(3), 410-437. 
Leahy, Dermot, and J. Peter Neary, 1997, “Public Policy Towards R&D in Oligopolistic Industries”, 
The American Economic Review, 87(4), 642-662. 
Lyons, Bruce, and Andrei Medvedev, 2007, “Bargaining over Remedies in Merger Regulation”, CCP 
Working Paper 07-3. 
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Michael Whinston, 1986, “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency”, The RAND 
Journal of Economics, 17(1), 48-58. 
Martin, Stephen, 2001, “Competition Policy for High Technology Industries”, Journal of Industry, 
Competition and Trade, 1(4), 441-465. 
Miceli, Thomas J., 2004, The Economic Approach to Law, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press. 
Motta, Massimo, 2004, Competition Policy – Theory and Practice, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Shapiro, C., 2002, “Competition Policy and Innovation”, OECD Science, Technology and Industry 
Working Papers, 2002/11, OECD Publishing, 
 




Sorgard, Lars, 2009, “Optimal Merger Policy: Enforcement vs. Deterrence”, The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 57(3), 438-456. 
Tirole, Jean, 1988, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT 
Press. 
9 – ANNEXES 
Proof of Proposition 1:  
a) From the optimization problem of symmetrical firms in the second stage we get the 
equilibrium 39 
 
Plugging   and  into the profit function of the firm, the first stage problem’s first order 
condition gives . 
Since we assumed the firms to be symmetric, taking  and consequently 
we have 
 
Investment is non-negative if we assume and the second order condition 
for the first stage  Moreover, we assume non-negative marginal cost 
as well. Under our previous assumptions, the derivative of the 
equilibrium investment level to the level of toughness of the competition policy is unambiguously 
negative for interior solutions. 
 b) Inserting the equilibrium value of investment in the expression for the individual 
equilibrium quantity we get (the results will essentially be the same for overall quantity in the 
market, since the number of firms is fixed and they are symmetric we have ) 
 
Whose derivative with respect to  is . This derivative will be positive 
if  , negative if  and zero if   
a) By computation of equilibrium values and straightforward calculations, the 
derivative of the equilibrium profit level of firm  with respect to  is  
  
Since we assumed , the sign of the derivative will be non-positive if 
, which will happen so long as  , which is the 
second order condition that must be satisfied.  
The contribution margin of each firm is in this case 
  
So it clearly decreases with increases in .  
                                                          
39 For this second stage problem, stability conditions of the equilibrium are verified according to 
Dixit’s prescriptions (1986). 
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 d) By interpreting the profit margin as   , we can reach some conclusions as to the sign of 
the derivative with respect to ( ) . 
As is concluded right away from the expression and the fact that  , if 
( ) the evolution of the profit margin will be unambiguously non-positive, whereas 
when ( ), its reaction to increases in rb will be ambiguous. 
 e) (No proof needed here.) 
 Proof of Proposition 2: 
a) Taking the second stage problem of the individual firm  and solving we get40 
 
Plugging the value obtained in the second stage in the first stage objective function for firm 
, the first order conditions are . 
The second order condition is given by . Considering the case in 
which firms are symmetric ( ) we have 
 
In which we assume as in the previous margin-based model and clearly 
has  for the interior solutions we are considering. 
b) (It will suffice to make the proof for , since ) Inserting the equilibrium 
investment value for firm  into the firm’s derived equilibrium quantity in the second stage we will 
have (assuming symmetry) . Its derivative with respect to  
is  , which is clearly positive for . 
c) Inserting the equilibrium values for investment and quantities in the profit function of 
the individual firm and taking the derivative with respect to we get 
   
 
The second term  is positive so long 
as the second order condition  is satisfied, so this derivative will be unambiguously 
non-positive, since is assumed.  
In equilibrium, the contribution margin is equal to 
 
For which the second term  will always be positive, Therefore, 
the contribution margin will always decrease with increases in . 
                                                          
40 The results here comply with the stability conditions prescribed by Dixit (1986). 
 




d) The profit margin can be interpreted as the individual profit divided by quantity  
whose derivative with respect to  will be  . Since and  it is 
apparent from the expression that the derivative will be negative and so the profit margin will 
decrease with a tougher competition policy. 
e) (No proof required for this result.)  
Proof of Proposition 3: 
In each model, (assuming no barriers to entry and symmetric firms) the equilibrium 
number of firms will be the largest integer below or equal to the level   that is obtained by setting 
the individual profit for the representative firm equal to zero. This means that potential entrant 
firms will remain out of the market because  for any real  such that .  
In the cost-reducing investment model, taking the equilibrium profit level for each 
firm , and setting we 
know that the second term  must always be larger 
than zero in order to respect the second order conditions . Similarly, in the second 
model, with  , the 
second term  is always larger than zero 
(due to second order conditions). 
 Thus, the only situation in which we can have  is when  in both 
models and therefore  . Since the equilibrium number of firms is the largest integer below 
or equal to , the effect of increases in the toughness of competition policy on the equilibrium 
number of firms will be non-positive in both models. 
Proof of Proposition 4: 
In the first model, from a social standpoint, we can say that it is optimal to have only one 
firm to begin with (due to the nature of the production technology, no duplication of the investment 
costs). Bearing this in mind, the outcome that maximizes the sum of consumer surplus with the 
firm’s individual profit is the one that sets prices equal to marginal costs ( ), and the 
investment level that maximizes social welfare is    (we need  in this case)41. There is 
no way that this outcome will be spontaneously reached as market outcome since the monopolistic 
firm would have negative profits. 
 The best the CA can do is to try and influence the  firms in the market, through the choice 
of in reaching the closest outcome to the optimum. For determining the optimal , taking the 
second-stage quantity decisions of firms as given, the Competition Authority will have to maximize 
the total welfare (TW) with respect to each firm’s investment level42. The TW expression and the 
problem of the CA in this case will be . Assuming symmetry, a 
generic first order condition from the problem, relative to the investment of firm  is 
                                                          
41 This is larger than , which, in the monopolistic free market functioning setting, is the 
optimal amount from the point of view of the firm. 
42 This approach is the same as the one adopted by Barros and Nilssen (1999) and will be used for 
both models. 
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. To align the firms’ incentives with its 
objectives, the CA will equal firm ’s first-stage first order condition (with symmetric firms) with 
the above one. From solving that equation we will get the optimal level of  from the point of view 
of the CA 
 
Which will be positive as long as , whereas for  it will be negative (we will have 
a subsidy).  The socially optimal outcome will not be reached in either case.  
At least for the cases up until the second order conditions for this problem impose 
higher minimum ratios than the ones demanded in the individual maximization problems. 
For  and , the minimum ratio required is so high that cases in which prices increase with 
 are ruled out. Other particular higher  were not considered individually due to the utter 
complexity of the calculations but, in the limit, as converges to infinity the minimum ratio 
required by the second order conditions is surely higher than the one demanded by individual 
profit maximization (for further discussion refer to the authors). 
Proof of Proposition 5: 
In the second model, investment is prejudicial from the point of view of society. In the 
symmetrical firms case, the optimal level of investment will be   by each firm, and because of 
the absence of fixed costs in this situation, the number of firms will be irrelevant for total welfare 
(sum of consumer surplus and firms’ profits) if price is set equal to marginal cost. 
The social optimum from society’s point of view is attainable with the optimal policy by the 
CA, independently of the number of firms.  By setting  taking the second-stage quantity 
decision as given, the Competition Authority will not only set investment by each firm equal to zero, 
but will also set individual quantities  . This way, the expected amount of fine firms will 
face will be equivalent to the quantities they set in the market and so they will earn zero profits.  
Total quantity in the market is and the firms will price at marginal cost. The final 
settlement of Welfare components from applying this measure will make expected firms’ profits 
and proceeds to the CA equal to zero, while providing consumers with a surplus of  . 
 Proof of Proposition 6: 
a), b) For this result, in both models, we took total welfare43 , and 
calculated its derivative with respect to evaluated at . In the own-cost-reducing 
investment model, in order to have , needs to be satisfied, 
and this will happen automatically for , because of the second order condition of 
the individual firm’s problem. In the anti-competitive investment model, to have the same positive 
derivative evaluated at , we only need , which is always verified, 
due to the fact that   (the second order condition of each firm’s problem is satisfied). 
Therefore, using this type of analysis, in the overwhelming majority of cases at hand we must say 
that having some intervention is better than having none at all (excluding costs of the CA). 
 
 
                                                          
43 Operating costs of the CA are not included in the calculations and the second order conditions of 
the individual firm’s problem are assumed to hold. 
